The internal reporting system (also known as the whistleblower system) for food safety serves as a vital instrument to compensate for inadequate regulatory capacity by leveraging the information advantage of insiders. However, the institutional inertia of treating whistleblowers as “tools” has led to a path dependence characterized by “prioritizing incentives, neglecting protection, and lacking remedies”. This has plunged the system into a predicament where protection mechanisms are hollowed out, incentive mechanisms are misaligned, and remedy mechanisms are dysfunctional. In response, this article proposes a systematic pathway for improvement, which involves: 1) constructing a robust protection line centered on “absolute confidentiality” and “comprehensive anti-retaliation” to reduce reporting risks ex ante; 2) establishing a precise incentive system based on “high-percentage, uncapped, and rule-based” rewards while optimizing the disbursement process to enhance incentive effectiveness; and 3) setting up dedicated remedy channels and implementing the reversal of the burden of proof to safeguard whistleblowers’ rights ex-post. This integrated strategy seeks to offer practical ideas for empowering internal supervision and fulfilling the system’s original purpose in food safety governance.

The improvement of the reverse linkage mechanism between administrative and criminal enforcement in the field of food safety provides an institutional safeguard to overcome the dilemma of “escaping punishment without criminal conviction”, which is crucial for the effectiveness of food safety governance and the vital interests of the public. Logically, this mechanism aligns with the goal-oriented approach of stringent crackdowns on food safety violations, embodies the practical implementation of the criminal policy of combining leniency with severity, and represents a strategic pathway to enhance food safety governance. However, its operation faces three major obstacles: cognitive bias hindering the linkage process, institutional gaps constraining its implementation, and insufficient technological integration undermining its efficiency. To address these, we propose reinforcing food safety governance principles, refining the institutional framework for the reverse connection between administrative and criminal enforcement and implementing embedded collaboration with digital technologies. These measures will support the mechanism’s operation and enhance food safety governance capacity.