This study incorporates blockchain technology (BT) and altruistic behavior into a fresh agricultural supply chain (FASC) consisting of a supplier and a powerful retailer. We firstly investigate the optimal strategies of FASC members under the baseline scenarios without and with BT (Scenarios N and B) and further explore three scenarios based on blockchain system: Supply chain members exhibiting complete altruistic preferences (Scenario BC), (2) the retailer’s unilateral altruistic preference (Scenario BR), and (3) the supplier’s unilateral altruistic preference (Scenario BS). Then, we design a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the FASC with the retailer’s unilateral altruistic behavior. Subsequently, we give a model extension with bilateral altruistic preferences between the retailer and the supplier (Scenario BA). Finally, numerical examples are employed to illustrate the models and their implications. The results indicate that the retailer’s unilateral altruistic reduce her own profit. While the supplier’s unilateral altruistic preference can only increase his own profit when the service investment coefficient is low. In comparison to the rational behavior of participants, both the unilateral altruistic preferences of the retailer and the supplier, as well as bilateral altruistic preferences, can promote the adoption of BT within the FASC.