This study incorporates blockchain technology (BT) and altruistic behavior into a fresh agricultural supply chain (FASC) consisting of a supplier and a powerful retailer. We firstly investigate the optimal strategies of FASC members under the baseline scenarios without and with BT (Scenarios N and B) and further explore three scenarios based on blockchain system: Supply chain members exhibiting complete altruistic preferences (Scenario BC), (2) the retailer’s unilateral altruistic preference (Scenario BR), and (3) the supplier’s unilateral altruistic preference (Scenario BS). Then, we design a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the FASC with the retailer’s unilateral altruistic behavior. Subsequently, we give a model extension with bilateral altruistic preferences between the retailer and the supplier (Scenario BA). Finally, numerical examples are employed to illustrate the models and their implications. The results indicate that the retailer’s unilateral altruistic reduce her own profit. While the supplier’s unilateral altruistic preference can only increase his own profit when the service investment coefficient is low. In comparison to the rational behavior of participants, both the unilateral altruistic preferences of the retailer and the supplier, as well as bilateral altruistic preferences, can promote the adoption of BT within the FASC.

The application of Blockchain Technology (BT) makes consumers trace more product information and enhances their trust in the product brand, but it also brings cost pressure to some participants who adopt the technology. Thus, it is particularly important how to encourage and support more enterprises to participate in BT. This study incorporates the altruistic preference into a BT-enabled three-echelon supply chain consisting of a powerful retailer, a supplier, and a manufacturer. We investigate the optimal strategies of the supply chain in different scenarios: without and with the BT, and without and with the altruistic preference. Then, we explore the effects of the BT and the retailer’s altruistic preference on the profit performance of the supply chain system. The results show that the retailer, the manufacturer, and the supplier do not always benefit from the traceability of the BT, and while the powerful retailer’s altruistic preference decreases his or her own profit but increases the profits of the manufacturer, the supplier, and the entire supply chain. Finally, a profit redistribution mechanism is designed to coordinate the supply chain with the retailer’s altruistic preference under the BT.