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Covert Deprivation through Flexible Governance: An Observation Based on the Phenomenon of Urban Management Officers “Breaking the Unspoken Agreement”
China Public Administration Review 2026, 8(3): 44-57
Published: 17 November 2026
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Based on a long-term field study of the “unspoken consensus” between urban management officers and street vendors in the X Street market of P City, this paper challenges the romantic imagination of “flexible governance” prevalent in existing scholarship. While prior research often portrays the informal understanding between urban management officers and vendors as a stable and harmonious governance outcome, it tends to overlook the underlying asymmetry of power and potential dispossession. Focusing on the phenomenon of enforcers “actively breaking the unspoken consensus”, this study reveals that the ultimate goal of flexible governance is not to establish a stable order, but rather to deliberately create and modulate the “tension between expectation and reality”, thereby keeping the governed in a continuous state of uncertainty to achieve low-cost and efficient social control. The research finds that, in the long-term practice of flexible governance, a kind of “unspoken consensus” based on informal rules emerges between enforcers and vendors. However, such consensus is inherently unstable. When vendors over-adapt to the rules, an influx of new vendors undermines the consensus’s foundation, or pressure from higher-level inspections arises, the enforcers will proactively break the consensus to reassert authority and restore street order. Enforcers primarily employ two strategies to break the consensus and manufacture uncertainty: firstly, the “experience disruption” strategy. By frequently changing enforcement jurisdictions, rotating personnel, and altering patrol routes and rhythms, they systematically undermine the stable expectations vendors have built from past experience, trapping them in a cycle of “re-cognition and re-adaptation”, thereby triggering immediate anxiety and self-regulation. Secondly, the “uncertainty management” strategy. By offering vague promises about the future while consistently withholding specific details, they place vendors in a state of “permanent temporariness”. This condition of “suspended resolution” compels vendors to actively comply with current controls in exchange for the possibility of future normalization, thus voluntarily constricting their behavioral boundaries. Faced with the rupture of consensus and the pressure of uncertainty, vendors are not entirely passive. They develop coping strategies such as building informal networks, sharing information across areas, and adopting dual “formal and informal” business models. This, in turn, prompts enforcers to anticipate “the vendors’ anticipation of governance”, leading to further strategy adjustments and the injection of new uncertainties. Consequently, a dynamic and escalating cycle of governance interaction is sustained. This paper uncovers the hidden logic of social control under the gentle appearance of flexible governance and reflects on its potential dispossessive nature, contributing to a more comprehensive understanding of the complex interactions between the state and society.

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