To achieve a“dual equilibrium”between the“game among trading entities”and the“water rights trading market”, thereby enhancing water rights trading benefits, this study takes industrial-agricultural water rights trading in the Upper Yellow River basin as a case study. It extends the traditional duopoly Cournot game model to a 4×4 game-theoretic model, which more accurately simulates the“many-to-many”market structure of water rights trading in the region. By incorporating market equilibrium, the study unifies the“game equilibrium among trading entities”with the“market equilibrium in water rights trading”. The results show that, without increasing water usage quotas, the“dual-equilibrium”water rights trading mechanism can generate 67.807 billion yuan in incremental benefits, improving water-saving incentives by 5.82 times, increasing net benefits by 8.06 times, and enhancing water use efficiency by 1.41 times. Significant potential exists for optimization in both price formation and trading volume for industrial-agricultural water rights trading in the upper Yellow River basin. The“dual-equilibrium”approach, through establishing a unified trading platform, innovating pricing models, and improving market signal transmission, can effectively guide the flow of water rights.