University laboratories are the foundation for talent cultivation and scientific and technological innovation, and their safety levels directly impact the quality of higher education. With the expansion of laboratory scale and the increasing complexity of experiments, traditional management approaches focusing on static hardware compliance are insufficient to address the systemic degradation of safety barrier systems caused by organizational vulnerabilities. This study aims to construct a Bowtie–high reliability organization (HRO) integrated analysis framework to systematically identify the pathways leading to laboratory accidents and analyze the degradation factors affecting safety barriers from the perspective of organizational reliability. The study findings will provide scientific methodological support for building a highly resilient laboratory safety system, ensuring the long-term safety and stability of research environments.

This study adopts a structured, multi-stage integrated analysis framework. First, the Bowtie model is used to construct a visualized “threat-barrier-consequence” risk path for laboratory accidents based on a statistical analysis of 176 typical domestic laboratory accident cases, ensuring objective risk identification. Second, the 4M1E theory (Man, Machine, Material, Method, and Environment) is introduced as an analytical dimension to examine potential degradation factors affecting 19 key safety barriers identified within the dynamic operational environment. Finally, HRO theory is employed to correlate these degradation factors with the five HRO characteristics (preoccupation with failure, reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise), diagnosing system-level organizational reliability failure points and formulating corresponding countermeasures.

The study results derived from the Bowtie-HRO model indicate the following. (1) Risk statistical characteristics: The main safety threats in university laboratories originate from hazardous chemicals (62.5%) and equipment failures (21.59%), with fires (47.73%) and explosions (30.68%) being the most serious types of accidents. (2) Barrier effectiveness diagnosis: The 19 key safety barriers identified in the study (such as centralized procurement of hazardous chemicals and emergency drills) show a tendency for dynamic degradation owing to personnel violations and management shortcomings. (3) Organizational attribution analysis: The HRO mapping reveals that technical-level barrier failures can often be traced back to organizational defects. For example, delayed information transmission reflects a lack of adherence to the “preoccupation with failure” principle, whereas inadequate implementation of dual-person, dual-lock management exposes serious deficiencies in the “deference to expertise” dimension. 4) Case study and empirical review: Analyzing typical explosion accidents confirms that the failure of multiple barriers can be traced back to specific organizational reliability deficiencies, including the use of non-explosion-proof equipment, lack of prior risk assessments, and unauthorized changes to experimental procedures.

The integration of the Bowtie and HRO models establishes a closed-loop management framework for laboratory safety, achieving a shift in safety focus from “static compliance” to “dynamic organizational reliability enhancement.” To prevent barrier degradation, this study proposes five safeguard strategies based on HRO characteristics: establishing a deviation reporting and learning mechanism to capture accident precursors, conducting multi-dimensional risk analyses to avoid oversimplification, implementing real-time monitoring based on sensing technology to enhance operational sensitivity, improving system resilience through redundant designs and scenario-based drills, and empowering frontline professionals to ensure that technical decisions are guided by professional judgment. These measures can ensure that critical barriers remain stable in complex environments, comprehensively improving the safety levels of university laboratories.