In this paper, a continuous-time insider trading model is investigated in which an insider is risk-seeking and market makers may receive partial information on the value of a risky asset. With the help of filtering theory and dynamic programming principle, the uniqueness and existence of linear equilibrium is established. It shows that (ⅰ) as time goes by, the residual information decreases, but both the trading intensity and the market liquidity increases, and (ⅱ) with the partial observation accuracy decreasing, both the market liquidity and the residual information will increase while the trading intensity decreases. On the whole, the risk-seeking insider is eager to trade all the trading period, and for market development, it is necessary to increase the insider's risk-preference behavior appropriately.

In this paper, we investigated a continuous version of an insider trading model. There were three basic assumptions in this model: (1) the insider exhibited risk-seeking, (2) market makers could receive partial signals regarding the risky asset, and (3) the risky asset was driven by a standard Brownian motion. By employing optimal filtering theory and stochastic control theory, we derived some necessary conditions for market equilibrium. Additionally, we established both the existence and uniqueness of the market equilibrium. At equilibrium, we observed that as time progresses, the insider's residual information gradually diminished when the volatility of the risky asset was low. In contrast, if the volatility was high, the insider's residual information initially increased. Meanwhile, the partial observation coefficient remained constant, while both trading intensity and market liquidity increased over time.