Value-added tax (VAT) is a tax levied on the realized value added in the production and consumption process when the excess VAT input tax credit is carried forward to be deducted in the next period. The refunding of excess VAT input tax credit changes the value-added tax into a consumptionbased value-added tax levied only on final consumption. The tax refund of VAT excess input credit is a deferred tax benefit given to enterprises of a going concern. Tax refund will make the governments' liquidity into enterprises' liquidity, reduce the tax burden of enterprises, but increase the pressure of government financial fund management. The current local sharing mechanism of refunding VAT excess input credit provides the fund cost sharing and refund risk sharing among the participating regions. From the perspective of inter-period revenue sharing and tax refund burden, this paper analyzes the provincial and sub-provincial tax refund sharing mechanism, which results in tax transfer between provinces and cities and the tax transfer between cities and localities in sub province. The current local tax refund sharing mechanism can be regarded as a new inter-regional horizontal transfer payment mechanism which is good to the implementation of refunding policy.

Guangzhou city is the first city to use the auction and lottery hybrid mechanism to allocate the car plates in traffic restriction cities. The efficiency and equity of allocation and the effects of talent subsidy are analyzed. Firstly, the Nash equilibrium of the game under Guangzhou Mechanism is analyzed and the willingness to pay for the car plates of auction participants are higher than the willingness to pay of the lottery participants. Secondly, after estimating the tail distribution of the participants’ willingness to pay, we find that the ratio of the consumer surplus to the revenue is about 5∶1, and the Gini coefficient of car plate accessibility is 0.42. Thirdly, we find that the talent subsidy may increase the bidding price and decrease the revenue from the car plate auction. The effect of talent subsidy on the efficiency and equity of allocation depends on the distribution of the willingness to pay of qualified participants of the talent subsidy.