The separation of rural land ownership, contracting rights, and management rights constitutes a crucial aspect of China's rural land property rights system. We construct a novel general equilibrium model that includes three markets for consumer goods, land ownership, and land use rights (abbreviated after merging contracting and operating rights). It shows that after collective land enters the market, housing price decreases and reflects more on the price of the use right. We further introduce shared ownership as a financial innovation into the framework above and find that some residents who originally planned to rent or buy houses purchased shared ownership houses. Model calibration shows that allowing collective land to trade can improve the welfare of low-income rural residents and mitigate wealth inequality (the wealth Gini coefficient dropped by 16%). The further introduction of shared ownership is a Pareto improvement. This study provides essential scientific insights into the economic impacts of collective land marketization and the implementation of the shared ownership housing systems, thereby facilitating a deeper understanding of the “separation of rights” reform in rural land in China.

With an aging population, regular epidemic prevention and control, and increased health awareness among residents, the reform of the public health system has been put on an influential agenda. To analyze the economic mechanism that leads to the insufficient resource allocation to the overall health system and the unbalanced resource allocation between prevention and treatment, we build a general equilibrium model which includes a prevention sector, a treatment sector, and a general consumer goods sector. We find that in the market equilibrium, the prevention externality will lead to an under-allocation in the prevention sector and an over-allocation in the treatment sector; the social welfare loss increases with prevention externality and treatment efficiency and decreases with prevention efficiency and residents’ health awareness. When local governments aim at maximizing GDP, the resource allocation distortion within the overall health system is more serious, and the over-expansion of the general consumer goods sector exacerbates the deficiency of resources in the overall health system; the social welfare loss is increasing in prevention externalities, prevention efficiency, and people’s preference for health. Hence, adjusting the incentives of local officials is also an essential issue in reforming the public health system.