Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized for semantic understanding and reasoning, yet their use in sensitive settings is limited by privacy concerns. This paper presents In-Mig, a mobile-agent architecture that integrates LLM reasoning within agents that can migrate across organizational venues. Unlike centralized approaches, In-Mig performs reasoning in situ, ensuring that raw data remains within institutional boundaries while allowing for cross-venue synthesis. The architecture features a policy-scoped memory model, utility-driven route planning, and cryptographic trust enforcement. A prototype using JADE for mobility and quantized Mistral-7B demonstrates practical feasibility. Evaluation across various scenarios shows that In-Mig achieves 92% similarity to centralized baselines, confirming its utility and strong privacy guarantees. These results suggest that migrating, privacy-preserving LLM agents can effectively support decentralized reasoning in trust-sensitive domains.

Windows malware is becoming an increasingly pressing problem as the amount of malware continues to grow and more sensitive information is stored on systems. One of the major challenges in tackling this problem is the complexity of malware analysis, which requires expertise from human analysts. Recent developments in machine learning have led to the creation of deep models for malware detection. However, these models often lack transparency, making it difficult to understand the reasoning behind the model’s decisions, otherwise known as the black-box problem. To address these limitations, this paper presents a novel model for malware detection, utilizing vision transformers to analyze the Operation Code (OpCode) sequences of more than 350000 Windows portable executable malware samples from real-world datasets. The model achieves a high accuracy of 0.9864, not only surpassing the previous results but also providing valuable insights into the reasoning behind the classification. Our model is able to pinpoint specific instructions that lead to malicious behavior in malware samples, aiding human experts in their analysis and driving further advancements in the field. We report our findings and show how causality can be established between malicious code and actual classification by a deep learning model, thus opening up this black-box problem for deeper analysis.