The crucial step in elliptic curve scalar multiplication based on scalar decompositions using efficient endomorphisms—such as GLV, GLS or GLV+GLS—is to produce a short basis of a lattice involving the eigenvalues of the endomorphisms, which usually is obtained by lattice basis reduction algorithms or even more specialized algorithms. Recently, lattice basis reduction is found to be unnecessary. Benjamin Smith (AMS 2015) was able to immediately write down a short basis of the lattice for the GLV, GLS, GLV+GLS of quadratic twists using elementary facts about quadratic rings. Certainly it is always more convenient to use a ready-made short basis than to compute a new one by some algorithm. In this paper, we extend Smith's method on GLV+GLS for quadratic twists to quartic and sextic twists, and give ready-made short bases for $4$-dimensional decompositions on these high degree twisted curves. In particular, our method gives a unified short basis compared with Hu et al.'s method (DCC 2012) for $4$-dimensional decompositions on sextic twisted curves.

This paper describes a generalized tweakable blockcipher HPH (Hash-Permutation-Hash), which is based on a public random permutation P and a family of almost-XOR-universal hash functions $\mathcal{H}={\left\{HK\right\}}_{K\in \mathcal{K}}$ as a tweak and key schedule, and defined as y = HPH_K((t₁, t₂), x) = P(x ⊕ H_K(t₁)) ⊕ H_K(t₂), where K is a key randomly chosen from a key space $\mathcal{K}$, (t₁, t₂) is a tweak chosen from a valid tweak space $\mathcal{T}$, x is a plaintext, and y is a ciphertext. We prove that HPH is a secure strong tweakable pseudorandom permutation (STPRP) by using H-coefficients technique. Then we focus on the security of HPH against multi-key and related-key attacks. We prove that HPH achieves both multi-key STPRP security and related-key STPRP security. HPH can be extended to wide applications. It can be directly applied to authentication and authenticated encryption modes. We apply HPH to PMAC1 and OPP, provide an improved authentication mode HPMAC and a new authenticated encryption mode OPH, and prove that the two modes achieve single-key security, multi-key security, and related-key security.