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The internal reporting system (also known as the whistleblower system) for food safety serves as a vital instrument to compensate for inadequate regulatory capacity by leveraging the information advantage of insiders. However, the institutional inertia of treating whistleblowers as “tools” has led to a path dependence characterized by “prioritizing incentives, neglecting protection, and lacking remedies”. This has plunged the system into a predicament where protection mechanisms are hollowed out, incentive mechanisms are misaligned, and remedy mechanisms are dysfunctional. In response, this article proposes a systematic pathway for improvement, which involves: 1) constructing a robust protection line centered on “absolute confidentiality” and “comprehensive anti-retaliation” to reduce reporting risks ex ante; 2) establishing a precise incentive system based on “high-percentage, uncapped, and rule-based” rewards while optimizing the disbursement process to enhance incentive effectiveness; and 3) setting up dedicated remedy channels and implementing the reversal of the burden of proof to safeguard whistleblowers’ rights ex-post. This integrated strategy seeks to offer practical ideas for empowering internal supervision and fulfilling the system’s original purpose in food safety governance.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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