Optimal Decisions for a Fresh Agricultural Product Supply Chain with Altruistic Behavior under Blockchain Technology

This study incorporates blockchain technology (BT) and altruistic behavior into a freshagricultural supply chain (FASC) consisting of a supplier and a powerful retailer. We firstly investigatethe optimal strategies of FASC members under the baseline scenarios without and with BT (ScenariosN and B) and further explore three scenariosbased on blockchain system: supply chain members exhibiting complete altruistic preferences(Scenario BC), (2) the retailer’s unilateral altruistic preference (Scenario BR), and (3) the supplier’sunilateral altruistic preference (Scenario BS). Then, we design a revenue-sharing contract to coordinatethe FASC with the retailer’s unilateral altruistic behavior. Subsequently, we give a model extension withbilateral altruistic preferences between the retailer and the supplier (Scenario BA). Finally, numericalexamples are employed to illustrate the models and their implications. The results indicate that theretailer’s unilateral altruistic reduce her own profit. While the supplier’s unilateral altruistic preferencecan only increase his own profit when the service investment coefficient is low. In comparison to therational behavior of participants, both the unilateral altruistic preferences of the retailer and the supplier,as well as bilateral altruistic preferences, can promote the adoption of BT within the FASC