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Digital platforms pose a fundamental challenge for government and market: how to foster innovation while maintaining effective regulation and market competition. Platform competition is shifting from products to users' attention. Yet existing research has paid limited attention to traffic as a competitive resource and to the mechanisms governing its acquisition, allocation, and use. From the perspective of government and economics, this paper defines traffic as a resource generated through platforms' organization and allocation of users' attention. It examines how platforms acquire, allocate, and compete for traffic, as well as the market failures that may arise from this process.
It finds that traffic competition in China has shifted toward a finite pool of users and attention as the number of Internet users and online time have stabilized. Platforms increasingly compete for users' attention, using membership systems and algorithmic recommendation to acquire and allocate traffic. This competition can distort traffic allocation and fuel excessive subsidy competition, with the resulting costs increasingly spilling over into the real economy.
Digital platform regulation should therefore extend beyond product markets to address competition for traffic. The key objective is to preserve open and contestable competition, while also considering platform size and market share. This requires stronger competition rules and greater platform responsibility for fair and transparent traffic allocation. Intelligent agents may further reshape traffic competition and regulation by becoming new gateways for information, transactions, and traffic allocation. Their growing role in directing users through digital markets will require platform governance to adapt while preserving open and contestable competition.
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