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Traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) only provides authentication for network communication, and the standard X.509 certificate used in this architecture reveals the user’s identity. This lack of privacy protection no longer satisfies the increasing demands for personal privacy. Though an optimized anonymous PKI certificate realizes anonymity, it has the potential to be abused due to the lack of identity tracking. Therefore, maintaining a balance between user anonymity and traceability has become an increasing requirement for current PKI. This paper introduces a novel traceable self-randomization certificate authentication scheme based on PKI architecture that achieves both anonymity and traceability. We propose a traceable self-randomization certificate authentication scheme based on the short randomizable signature. Specifically, certificate users can randomize the initial certificate and public key into multiple anonymous certificates and public keys by themselves under the premise of traceability, which possesses lower computational complexity and fewer interactive operations. Users can exhibit different attributes of themselves in different scenarios, randomizing the attributes that do not necessarily need to be displayed. Through security and performance analysis, we demonstrate the suitability of the improved PKI architecture for practical applications. Additionally, we provide an application of the proposed scheme to the permissioned blockchain for supervision.


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tsrCert: Traceable Self-Randomization Certificate and Its Application to Blockchain Supervision

Show Author's information Yan Zhu1Haibin Zheng2,3( )Bo Qin4( )Wanting Fu1Zhenwei Guo2Yujue Wang2Qianhong Wu1Bingyu Li1Xuan Ding5
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China
Hangzhou Innovation Institute, Beihang University, Hangzhou 310051, China
Key Laboratory of Cryptography of Zhejiang Province, Hangzhou Normal University, Hangzhou 311121, China
School of Information, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China
School of Software and BNRist, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Abstract

Traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) only provides authentication for network communication, and the standard X.509 certificate used in this architecture reveals the user’s identity. This lack of privacy protection no longer satisfies the increasing demands for personal privacy. Though an optimized anonymous PKI certificate realizes anonymity, it has the potential to be abused due to the lack of identity tracking. Therefore, maintaining a balance between user anonymity and traceability has become an increasing requirement for current PKI. This paper introduces a novel traceable self-randomization certificate authentication scheme based on PKI architecture that achieves both anonymity and traceability. We propose a traceable self-randomization certificate authentication scheme based on the short randomizable signature. Specifically, certificate users can randomize the initial certificate and public key into multiple anonymous certificates and public keys by themselves under the premise of traceability, which possesses lower computational complexity and fewer interactive operations. Users can exhibit different attributes of themselves in different scenarios, randomizing the attributes that do not necessarily need to be displayed. Through security and performance analysis, we demonstrate the suitability of the improved PKI architecture for practical applications. Additionally, we provide an application of the proposed scheme to the permissioned blockchain for supervision.

Keywords: public key infrastructure, traceable self-randomization certificate, randomizable signature, anonymity and traceability, blockchain supervision

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Received: 28 April 2023
Revised: 25 May 2023
Accepted: 26 May 2023
Published: 28 July 2023
Issue date: December 2023

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© The author(s) 2023.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the National Key R&D Program of China (No. 2020YFB1005600), Beijing Natural Science Foundation (No. M21031), the Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. U21A20467, 61932011, 62002011, and 61972019), the Populus Euphratica Foundation (No. CCF-HuaweiBC2021009), the Open Research Fund of Key Laboratory of Cryptography of Zhejiang Province (No. ZCL21007), Zhejiang Soft Science Research Program (No. 2023C35081), and the Youth Top Talent Support Program of Beihang University (No. YWF-22-L-1272).

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