RISP: An RPKI-Based Inter-AS Source Protection Mechanism

IP source address spoofing is regarded as one of the most prevalent components when launching an anonymous invasion, especially a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack. Although Source Address Validations (SAVs) at the access network level are standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), SAV at the inter-Autonomous System (AS) level still remains an important issue. To prevent routing hijacking, the IETF is constructing a Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) as a united trust anchor to secure interdomain routing. In this study, we creatively use the RPKI to support inter-AS SAV and propose an RPKI-based Inter-AS Source Protection (RISP) mechanism. According to the trust basis provided by the RPKI, RISP offers ASes a more credible source-oriented protection for the IP addresses they own and remains independent of the RPKI. Based on the experiments with real Internet topology, RISP not only provides better incentives, but also improves efficacy and economizes bandwidth with a modest resource consumption.