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27 February 2024
Should the Title of Talents Be Necessary? A Study on the “Open Bidding for Selecting the Best Candidates” Mechanism
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In order to improve the efficiency of scientific research and innovation, China is accelerating the exploration and implementation of the “Open Bidding for Selecting the Best Candidates” mechanism. How to identify and select the high-level research teams and project leaders who are capable to make breakthroughs in core technologies is the key challenge of this new type of talents selection mechanism. Recent practical experience has shown that most of the research project leaders selected by this mechanism have one or more titles of talents. This paper aims at exploring whether the title of talents can fully reflect the research ability and team leadership of the scholars and then become necessary for selecting the best candidates. Based on a sample of selected project leaders, the empirical results show that although the title of talents facilitates the scholars to win honor and awards, the title of talents has no significant effects on their research achievements in terms of the quantity of academic papers, books, and projects, and also it is not related to their research leadership. Our findings provide policy implications that the title of talents should play a limited role in the “Open Bidding for Selecting the Best Candidates” mechanism.
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Should the Title of Talents Be Necessary? A Study on the “Open Bidding for Selecting the Best Candidates” Mechanism
)
Abstract
In order to improve the efficiency of scientific research and innovation, China is accelerating the exploration and implementation of the “Open Bidding for Selecting the Best Candidates” mechanism. How to identify and select the high-level research teams and project leaders who are capable to make breakthroughs in core technologies is the key challenge of this new type of talents selection mechanism. Recent practical experience has shown that most of the research project leaders selected by this mechanism have one or more titles of talents. This paper aims at exploring whether the title of talents can fully reflect the research ability and team leadership of the scholars and then become necessary for selecting the best candidates. Based on a sample of selected project leaders, the empirical results show that although the title of talents facilitates the scholars to win honor and awards, the title of talents has no significant effects on their research achievements in terms of the quantity of academic papers, books, and projects, and also it is not related to their research leadership. Our findings provide policy implications that the title of talents should play a limited role in the “Open Bidding for Selecting the Best Candidates” mechanism.
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Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Beijing Social Science Fund Project: Research on the Evaluation Mechanism and Selection Strategy of Beijing’s “Open Bidding for Selecting the Best Candidates” Scientific Research Team (No. 22JCC079).
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The articles published in this open access journal are distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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