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Article | Open Access

Opportunities for U.S.-China engagement on development finance for overseas renewable energy

Joanna I. Lewis1( ), Cecilia Han Springer2
Science, Technology and International Affairs Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 3700 O ST NW, Washington, DC 20057, USA
Global China Initiative, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215, USA
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Abstract

A dramatic scaling of renewable energy is needed to achieve global climate goals. In this paper, we systematically present the potential set of opportunities that exist for the United States and China to engage on overseas renewable energy development finance. We find that there is substantial complementarity in the institutions and instruments that the U.S. and China have deployed to promote development finance overseas. Given their relative specializations, we find that there is a potential opportunity for further U.S.-China coordination and cooperation on overseas renewable energy. In combining our assessment of initiatives that would have the most impact and yet also be viable in terms of the level of coordination that is feasible under current conditions, we recommend a focus on the following areas for expanding U.S.-China engagement on renewable energy development finance: 1) joint project finance; 2) joint capacity building efforts and 3) parallel bilateral investment principles and standards. These three areas pose a significant potential for accelerating the renewable energy transition by increasing financing opportunities in the Global South and are areas where both countries would see a common interest and benefit to expanding cooperation and coordination, even in the current environment.

Keywords

U.S.-China engagementrenewable energy financedevelopment financeclimate mitigationdevelopment finance institutions

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Energy and Climate Management
Volume 1 Issue 1,
March 2025
Article number: 9400008
DOI: 10.26599/ECM.2024.9400008
Cite this article:
Lewis JI, Springer CH. Opportunities for U.S.-China engagement on development finance for overseas renewable energy. Energy and Climate Management, 2025, 1(1): 9400008. https://doi.org/10.26599/ECM.2024.9400008

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Received: 08 January 2024
Revised: 01 April 2024
Accepted: 22 May 2024
Published: 09 October 2024
© The author(s) 2025.

This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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