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East-West collaboration is a core institutional arrangement for the state to coordinate balanced regional development and substantially advance common prosperity. Industrial cooperation, as a key lever within this framework, carries the important mission of cultivating endogenous development momentum in western recipient regions and achieving synergistic industrial upgrading across regions, yet in practice it has fallen into the predicament that industrial projects struggle to become self-sustaining and lack long-term viability. This paper takes East-West industrial cooperation as its research subject, conducting an in-depth analysis of the manifestations, impacts, and formation mechanisms of strategic selection behaviors by grassroots governments. The study finds that, under the triple institutional constraints of time, resources, and performance, eastern assisting parties and western recipient parties have developed three types of strategic selection behavior characterized by flexible entry, leveraged coexistence, and patchwork integration. These three types correspond, respectively, to grassroots rationales of fulfilling tasks, mitigating risks, and creating showcases, yet in essence they constitute a deviation from the long-term development goals of industrial cooperation. The research further reveals that the emergence of strategic selection behaviors is not an isolated grassroots response but rather the structural coupling of vertical central-local bargaining and horizontal intergovernmental collusion: the full-chain bargaining between central and local governments over residual control rights shapes, at the institutional source, the action space and incentives for strategic selection; meanwhile, the horizontal intergovernmental collusion formed between eastern and western partners on the basis of differentiated interest calculations serves as the core practical mechanism through which strategic selection behaviors are implemented and sustained. Together, these two dimensions constitute the key transmission logic from “institutional constraints to grassroots behavior.” By examining the dual perspectives of intergovernmental interaction and behavioral strategy, this paper elucidates the deep-seated reasons why East-West industrial cooperation struggles to build self-sustaining capacity, offering theoretical reference and practical insights for optimizing the institutional design of East-West collaboration, improving long-term assistance mechanisms, and steering industrial cooperation back toward high-quality development.
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