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Perspectives from Field | Publishing Language: Chinese

Why Is the “Pension” for Common Parts of Residential Buildings Unable to Fulfill Its Intended Role? A Field Study Based on District J of N City

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Nanjing Forestry University
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Abstract

The Housing Special Maintenance Fund serves as a “pension” for the long-term maintenance of common parts of urban residential buildings. However, in practice, issues such as low efficiency in application and utilization, as well as subpar engineering quality, are widespread. From the perspective of multiple principal-agent theory, this study takes the management and operations practices of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund in District J of City N as a typical case to investigate why the Housing Special Maintenance Fund system fails to function as intended in practice. The research finds that various actors in the management of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund have formed multiple principal-agent relationships with homeowners as the principal. These diverse actors follow different logics of action: As the principal, homeowners operate under a self-interested logic amidst fragmented delegation rights, and they face adverse selection due to information asymmetries. The government, driven by political requirements, assumes strong agent responsibilities but exhibits a “blame-avoidance” logic that prioritizes “safety and compliance” under weak regulatory capacity. Engineering actors, in the loosely regulated environment, tend to collude with property management companies and homeowners' committees—both of which assume dual roles—in pursuit of profits, leading to moral hazard and other agent problems. The interplay of these logics shapes multiple dilemmas in the management of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund, including homeowner collaboration challenges, government regulatory difficulties, and loss of control over agents. Enhancing the organizational level of homeowners, promoting active government accountability, and strengthening professional regulatory capacity over market actors are identified as feasible pathways to address these multifaceted dilemmas and to improve the operational performance of the Housing Special Maintenance Fund.

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China Public Administration Review
Pages 200-213

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Cite this article:
QIAN K. Why Is the “Pension” for Common Parts of Residential Buildings Unable to Fulfill Its Intended Role? A Field Study Based on District J of N City. China Public Administration Review, 2025, 7(4): 200-213. https://doi.org/10.26599/CPAR.2025.9680409

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Published: 10 April 2026
© 2025 Tsinghua University Press