Research on the Effects of Growth Goals on Local Allocation of Environmental Attention

Guidance on growth targets is an important feature of China's economy. In practice, how do local governments allocate policy attention based on growth targets to resolve the conflicts among multi-target tasks?

Through text mining of government work reports, this article answers the above question from the perspective of the allocation of environmental attention. We find that: the greater the growth target pressures faced by local governments, the lower their attention to environmental protection, as reflected in government work reports. Local agents generally face the dual pressures of tapping into the growth potential of their jurisdictions and completing the target tasks imposed by their superiors. Among these, the inhibitory effects of the first type of target pressures on the allocation of environmental attention is 1.5 times more than that for the second type. Officials with lower promotion incentives will dilute the inhibitory effects of the second type of target pressure, exhibiting a greater focus on environmental protection than other officials. Compared with the secretary of the municipal Party committee, the mayor is more likely to strengthen the inhibitory effects of the first type of target pressure.

Further research finds that local officials tend to reduce environmental attention during the year a Party congress is held as well as within two years after it is held, and the effects of attention to environmental regulation and investment are not obvious. But paying attention to the environment has a positive impact on the careers of local officials, especially the mayors. The policy implication of this article is that for tasks with long lifecycles and a lack of immediate results, process assessments are more crucial than outcome assessments. To improve the substantive governance effects of allocation of policy attention, it is necessary to first alleviate the conflicts between the objectives of multiple tasks.