Taxi-Sharing Matching Equilibrium Under Peer-Passenger Incentive Mechanism

In view of the problem that passengers motivate ride-hailing drivers in the form of red packet or dispatching fees to realize self-scheduling, this paper studied the interactive relationship between passenger-ride-hailing matching decision and incentive strategy choice. Based on the matching equilibrium in taxi-sharing, this paper designed a matching equilibrium model for taxi-sharing with peer-passenger incentive mechanism, taking the maximization of total passenger surplus as the goal and considering the constraints such as matching, equilibrium and cost. From the perspective of passengers, it designed the passenger incentive strategy, ride-hailing incentive strategy, passenger and ride-hailing incentive strategy, and the three incentive strategies were embedded into the column generation algorithm to solve the model and to achieve matching equilibrium and pricing equilibrium. By empirical analysis of Dalian taxi data, the results show that, compared with with only motivating drivers from the supply side in the form of random dispatching fees, the implementation of incentive strategies from the demand side and the supply side can promote taxi-share, and the passenger surplus can be increased by 12.6%. When the demand is larger than the supply, about 26% of incentive is transferred among peer passengers for more taxi-share matches. The fare discount rate also affects the flow of incentives. Using incentive strategies and discount strategies simultaneously can avoid malicious competition and ineffective incentives. By increasing the number of taxi-sharing trips, we can simultaneously reduce travel costs for passengers and boost driver incomes.