@article{Mendoza2026, 
author = {Ronald U. Mendoza and Jurel K. Yap and Gabrielle Ann S. Mendoza and Leonardo  Jaminola Ⅲ and Erica Celine Yu},
title = {Economic Development under Political Dynasties: The Philippine Model},
year = {2026},
journal = {Research in Government and Economics},
volume = {2},
number = {1},
pages = {94-108},
keywords = {political dynasties, economic elites, Philippine model},
url = {https://www.sciopen.com/article/10.26599/RGE.2026.9720106},
doi = {10.26599/RGE.2026.9720106},
abstract = {The Philippine model can serve as a classic example of economic development under political dynasties. Political dynasties refer to a situation in which an incumbent elected official has relatives in elected offices in the past or the present government. This phenomenon is widespread globally, existing in many developing countries as well as numerous developed countries. In the Philippines, for example, almost 80% of members of Congress and well over 50% of all elected local government officials are from political families. Numerous studies have indicated that political dynasties abuse public power to seize social resources, restrain market competition, erode economic vitality, and exacerbate poverty. Empirical evidence from the Philippines shows that political dynasties have exacerbated poverty in provinces outside Luzon, whereas no significant correlation has been observed between the two in Luzon's provinces. Further study indicates that independent economic elites in Luzon's provinces have effectively checked the negative impact of political dynasties on poverty. This countervailing effect stems from three mechanisms: economic elites can “vote with their feet”; they can engage in a contest of strength against dynastic politics; and they can form potential interest alignments with political dynasties, thereby jointly driving the long-term development of the local economy.}
}