@article{WEI2025, 
author = {Wei WEI and Yaxian PENG and Li DAI and Jiahao HUANG},
title = {Influencing factors and optimization paths of government-enterprise cooperation in high-standard farmland construction from the perspective of evolutionary game theory and complex networks},
year = {2025},
journal = {Transactions of the Chinese Society of Agricultural Engineering},
volume = {41},
number = {21},
pages = {269-277},
keywords = {high-standard farmland construction, government and enterprise, evolutionary game, complex network, simulation analysis},
url = {https://www.sciopen.com/article/10.11975/j.issn.1002-6819.202501086},
doi = {10.11975/j.issn.1002-6819.202501086},
abstract = {High-standard farmland construction is closely related to national food security in recent years. The government and enterprises are important entities to promote the high-quality development of high-standard farmland construction. In this study, the game models were established for the “government-enterprise” and enterprise groups, according to the evolutionary game and complex network theory. A systematic analysis was made on the evolutionary stability and network topologies of the game models. A case study was taken as the high-standard farmland construction in Wuhan, Xiangyang, and Xiantao cities of Hubei Province. There were the strategy choices and connection preferences of the game players. An investigation was finally implemented to explore the key influence factors on the government-enterprise cooperation and the enterprise group game. The results showed that: 1) Assessment rewards, incentive policies, and regulatory penalties all shared the positive effects on the sound government-enterprise cooperation. The magnitude of their influence exhibited a sequentially decreasing trend: the assessment rewards shared the strongest impact, followed by incentive policies, with the least direct influence of regulatory penalties on the cooperation levels. Furthermore, the assessment rewards and incentive policies were significantly dependent on the strategic choices of both government and enterprises under varying intensities. In contrast, the regulatory penalties primarily impacted the enterprise behavior, thus acting as a stronger deterrent or compliance driver for enterprises. 2) The reward and incentive levels were maintained at approximately 50% the additional costs incurred by enterprises for the high-standard compliance. The most positive performances were achieved in engaging the cooperative government-enterprise. This level was sufficiently motivated the enterprises without the excessive fiscal burdens. Conversely, when the reward and incentive levels were reached 4 times the additional costs, there was a significant shift in the government strategy. The fiscal burden or perceived inefficiency often led to a reduction in its support or intensified regulatory measures instead of the high incentives. 3) Enterprises demonstrated that there was a high sensitivity to cost variations. Excessive additional compliance costs and disproportionately high regulatory penalties significantly reduced the enterprise participation. This inhibitory effect was particularly pronounced within the enterprise population game model. Crucially, the participation was propagated extensively across the enterprise network, particularly for the leading enterprises or “industry champions”. These key players encouraged the wider adoption, while their reluctance triggered the widespread hesitancy within the network. The following optimization paths were proposed based on the research results: Firstly, a targeted approach was adopted to implement the different incentives and rewards. Specific enterprise types, project scales, regional features, and actual compliance costs were calibrated for the decision-making. Enterprise willingness can be expected to participate simultaneously for the overall policy implementation costs within a fiscally sustainable and reasonable range. The high-intensity incentives can also be avoided to trigger the strategy shifts. Secondly, a precise regulatory framework can be established to enhance the overall compliance level of the enterprise group, according to the “red and yellow card” classification. As such, these pathways can significantly improve the government-enterprise cooperation, thereby accelerating the high-quality development of high-standard farmland construction in China.}
}