@article{Ren2016, 
author = {Yanting Ren and Liji Wu and Hexin Li and Xiangyu Li and Xiangmin Zhang and An Wang and Hongyi Chen},
title = {Key Recovery Against 3DES in CPU Smart Card Based on Improved Correlation Power Analysis},
year = {2016},
journal = {Tsinghua Science and Technology},
volume = {21},
number = {2},
pages = {210-220},
keywords = {Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES), CPU smart cards, power analysis, key recovery, side-channel analysis},
url = {https://www.sciopen.com/article/10.1109/TST.2016.7442503},
doi = {10.1109/TST.2016.7442503},
abstract = {The security of CPU smart cards, which are widely used throughout China, is currently being threatened by side-channel analysis. Typical countermeasures to side-channel analysis involve adding noise and filtering the power consumption signal. In this paper, we integrate appropriate preprocessing methods with an improved attack strategy to generate a key recovery solution to the shortcomings of these countermeasures. Our proposed attack strategy improves the attack result by combining information leaked from two adjacent clock cycles. Using our laboratory-based power analysis system, we verified the proposed key recovery solution by performing a successful correlation power analysis on a Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) hardware module in a real-life 32-bit CPU smart card. All 112 key bits of the 3DES were recovered with about 80 000 power traces.}
}